Book Three

[DISCOURSES I9-23]

[ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS: THE RIVAL CLAIMS OF SEVERITY AND GOOD FELLOWSHIP]

19. Whether in controlling the Masses Considerateness[1] is more Necessary than Punishment

Machiavelli uses classical and contemporary (contemporary to the 16^th century when he wrote) sources to illustrate his practical instructions regarding the government of republics.

You can read more about this period in Roman history here.

The underlines are added for special emphasis.

This section of The Discourses bears a strong resemblance to chapter 17 of The Prince, “Whether it is better to be loved than feared.” See also chapter 19.

THOUGH the Roman republic was distraught owing to the hostility between the nobles and the plebs, none the less, when war came, it commissioned Quintius and Appius Claudius to lead the armies forth. Appius, who was a brutal and harsh commander, was so badly obeyed by his troops that he had to quit his province as though he had been defeated. Quintius, who was of a kindly and humane disposition, was obeyed by his troops and returned victorious. It would seem better, therefore, in controlling a large number of men, to be humane rather than arrogant, compassionate rather than cruel. [460] Cornelius Tacitus, however,--and many other writers agree with him--arrives at the opposite conclusion, which he expresses in these words: `In ruling the masses punishment is of more avail than considerateness.

Notice the distinction he makes between the techniques to use with associates versus subjects.

Cornelius Tacitus was a Roman historian whose Histories and Annals chronicle Roman history from 14 to 96 A.D.

Livy says that Appius Claudius, a leader in the early Republic, was chosen to lead the troops because he "had been hated by [the plebs] and cordially hated them in return." You can read more about the trouble he had controlling his troops.

Under Quinctius command, co-consul with Appius, "Just the opposite state of things prevailed, where the consul and his soldiers vied with each other in acts of kindness and comrade-ship. Quinctius was naturally milder, and the unfortunate severity of his colleague made him all the more inclined to follow the bent of his gentle disposition." You can read more of Livy's account.

With a view to reconciling these two opinions I would point out that either the men you have to rule are in ordinary circumstances your associates, or they have always been your subjects. When they are your associates, you cannot in your dealings with them use penalties, nor yet that severity which Cornelius advocates. Wherefore, since in Rome the plebs had an equal share in the government with the nobility, neither could, on becoming the ruler for the time being, treat the other brutally and harshly. Very often, too, one sees that Roman generals succeeded better when they made their armies love them and treated them with consideration than did those who made themselves excessively feared, unless such behaviour was accompanied by outstanding virtue, as it was in the case of Manlius Torquatus. On the other hand, in governing one's subjects, which is what Cornelius has in mind, lest they should become insolent and trample on you should you be too easy with them, it is better to rely on punishment rather than on considerateness. But this also should be used with moderation, so as to avoid cause for hatred; for no ruler benefits by making himself odious. To avoid this he should leave his subjects' property alone; for, except as a cover for pillage, no prince is keen on shedding blood unless he be driven to it, and need for this seldom arises. But in connection with pillage bloodshed is always happening, nor is either the occasion or the desire to shed it ever lacking, as in another treatise discussing- this topic has been shown at length.⁶⁵ More praise is due, then, to Quintius than to Appius, and Cornelius's view, under the conditions he supposes but not in those observed in the case of Appius, deserves approbation.

You can see the contrast of these two approaches from Livy here.

[461] And while we are on this topic of punishment and considerateness it will not be irrelevant, I think, to cite a case in which an act of common decency availed more with the Falisci than did the use of arms.

20. A Single Act of Common Humanity made a Greater Impression' on the Falisci than did all the Forces of Rome⁶⁶

The Falisci were "ancient people of southern Etruria in Italy who, though Latin in nationality and speech, were culturally closer to the Etruscans. They occupied the region between the Tiber River and Mt. Ciminus, with Falerii (modern Civita Castellana) as their capital. Resistance of the Falisci to Rome began in 437 BC, when they joined with Veii in the Etruscan alliance against the common enemy and ended with the razing of Falerii by the Romans in 241 BC" (from Encyclopedia Britannica).

Camillus (d. 365 BC) was a Roman soldier and statesman who came to be honoured after the sack of Rome by the Gauls (c. 390) as the second founder of the city.

WHEN Camillus and his army lay before the Faliscan city, which he was besieging, a schoolmaster who taught the most noble youths in the city, thinking to ingratiate himself with Camillus and the Roman people, went with his pupils outside the town ostensibly to give them exercise, led them to where Camillus was encamped, and offered to hand them over, saying that, if they were used as a lever, the town would place itself in his hands. Camillus not only rejected the offer, but had the teacher stripped, his hands tied behind his back, and to each of the boys gave a rod with which to beat him often and hard on his way back to the town. When the citizens saw this, they were so pleased with the humanity and integrity of Camillus that they no longer wanted to go on with the defence, but decided to hand over the town. This authentic incident affords us an excellent example of how a humane and kindly act sometimes makes a much greater impression than an act of ferocity or violence; and how districts and cities into which neither arms nor the accoutrements of war, nor any other kind of human force would have been able to obtain entry, it has been possible to enter by displaying common humanity and kindness, continence or generosity.

Pyrrhus (318?-272 BC) was king of Epirus, a district in ancient Greece.

Fabricius (3rd c. BC) was a Roman commander and statesman whose incorruptibility and austerity were frequently regarded as models of the early Roman virtues.

Of this there are in history many other examples besides the above. One sees, for instance, how Roman forces failed to drive Pyrrhus from Italy, which he quitted, none the less, owing to the generosity of Fabricius who told him of an offer [462] which had been made to the Romans by one of his servants, to poison him. One sees, too, how Scipio Africanus did not gain so much renown in Spain for taking New Carthage as he did by the continence he showed in sending back to her husband his young and beautiful wife, inviolate. The repute he gained by this action made the whole of Spain his friend.

Xenophon (430?-355? BC) was a Greek historian, soldier, and essayist, whose works contribute greatly to knowledge of Greece and Persia in the 4th century BC.

Cyrus II (d. c. 529 BC) was known as Cyrus the Great,   who founded the Achaemenian empire, centred on Persia and comprising the Near East from the Aegean Sea eastward to the Indus River. He is also remembered in the Cyrus legend—first recorded by Xenophon, Greek soldier and author, in his Cyropaedia—as a tolerant and ideal monarch who was called the father of his people by the ancient Persians. In the Bible he is the liberator of the Jews who were captive in Babylonia.

We see, again, how keen peoples are on their great men doing this kind of thing, and how much it is praised by writers, both by the biographers of princes and by those who have laid down rules for their behaviour. Xenophon, for instance, is at considerable pains to show what great honours, what great victories, and how much good repute Cyrus gained by his humanity and his affability, and how entirely free he was from pride, cruelty, licentiousness and other vices by which the lives of men are marred. Since, however, Hannibal gained great fame and great victories by the opposite method, it is fitting that in the next chapter I should inquire how this came about.

21. How it comes about that Hannibal, whose Procedure differed radically from Scipio's, yet produced the same Effect in Italy as Scipio did in Spain

Scipio was the Roman general who defeated Carthage in the Second Punic War, 202 B.C. You can read more about him here.

Hannibal was his opponent, a general of Carthage, best known for crossing the Alps with his elephants to invade Rome in 218-17 B.C. You can read about it here.

SOME people, I fancy, would be astonished were they to notice how certain generals, in spite of their having adopted a contrary line of conduct, produced the same effects as those who behaved in the way we have just described. Hence it would seem that the causes of victory did not rest on the grounds alleged, but, on the contrary, that such methods bring you neither greater strength nor better luck, since glory and reputation can be gained by the opposite methods. Let me keep to the two men mentioned above, and try to make my meaning more clear. Scipio, we find, entered Spain and by his humane and kindly conduct at once made that country [463] his friend, and won the respect and admiration of its people. We find, on the other hand, that Hannibal entered Italy and by totally different methods, i.e. by cruelty, violence, rapine and every sort of perfidy, produced there the same effect as Scipio had produced in Spain; for all the Italian cities revolted to him, and all its peoples became his followers.

In chapter 17 of The Prince, Machiavelli cites the same contrast of Hannibal and Scipio, but instead of concluding as he does here that each achieved the same effect, he claims that Scipio’s leadership suffered because of his kind treatment. He seems to come to the opposite conclusion than he does here: “Love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.”

Compare what he says in discourse I.3, “Men never do good unless necessity drives them to it.”

If one asks how this came about, there would appear to be several reasons. First, men are fond of novelty; so much so that those who are prosperous desire it as much as those who are poor. For, as has been said before, and rightly, in prosperity men get fed up, and in adversity cast down. Now, this desire for novelty throws open the door to anyone in the neighbourhood who puts himself at the head of a new movement. If he be a foreigner, men run after him; and, if he be a local man, they crowd round him, boost him and push him forward; with the result that, whatever line he takes, he succeeds in making great headway in this locality. Besides which, men are moved in the main by two things; either by love or by fear. Hence it comes about that a person in authority may be either one who makes himself loved or one who makes himself feared. Indeed, a man who makes himself feared is usually better followed and better obeyed than is one who makes himself loved.

The definition of “virtue” here is different than our typical sense of moral virtue. Instead, Machiavelli has in mind virtue as skill, as seen in the term virtuosity. In his introduction to The Discourses, Bernard Crick provides a helpful discussion of Machiavelli’s approach to virtue and other key terms such as necessity and fortune..

See The Prince chapter 19, “That one should avoid being despised.”

It matters then little to a general along which road he travels, provided he has virtuosity, and his virtue gives him standing with men. For when there is great efficiency as there was in Hannibal and Scipio, it counterbalances all the mistakes due to their having made themselves too much loved or too much feared. For from both of these two lines of conduct there may arise serious inconveniences, likely to bring about the downfall of a ruler; because he who is too anxious to gain affection, should there be any little departure from the straight path, may become despised: while the other, who is anxious to be feared, should there be any excess in his behaviour, may [464] become odious. And to keep precisely on the middle path cannot be done, for it is alien to our nature. Hence it is necessary that any excesses in action should be compensated by exceeding efficiency, as they were in Hannibal and Scipio. None the less, though it was by behaving thus that they made their name, it is clear that in both cases their conduct did them harm.

How each of them came to make his name has already been explained. The harm done, so far as Scipio is concerned, was that in Spain his soldiers mutinied, and were joined by some of his allies. This was due entirely to their not being afraid of him; for men are so restless that should the least thing open the door to their ambition, they at once belie the love which their ruler may have evoked by his decency, as did the aforesaid soldiers and allies. Consequently Scipio, to remove this inconvenience, had to resort to some measure of that cruelty which he had thus far avoided. As to Hannibal, there is no particular instance of his cruelty or his faithlessness doing him harm. One can well imagine, however, that Naples and many other towns which remained loyal to the Roman people, did so through fear of him. It is certain, too, that his impious behaviour made him more odious to the Roman people than any other enemy which that republic ever had. For, whereas to Pyrrhus, when he and his army were in Italy, they revealed a plot to poison him, they never forgave Hannibal, even when his troops were disarmed and disbanded, until they had compassed his death. Owing to Hannibal's reputation for impiety, faithlessness and cruelty, then, this inconvenience arose; but, on the other hand, he derived from it a very great advantage, of which all writers have spoken with admiration. For, though his army was composed of men from different races, there never arose any dissension either among the men themselves or between them and him. This can only have been due to the terror his person inspired, which was so great that, in con[465]junction with the reputation he acquired for efficiency, it kept his troops quiet and united.

I conclude, therefore, that it does not matter much in what way a general behaves, provided his efficiency be so great that it flavours the way in which he behaves, whether it be in this way or that. For, as we have said, in both there are defects and dangers unless they be corrected by outstanding virtue. Hence, if Hannibal and Scipio produced the same effect, the one by praiseworthy and the other by reprehensible methods, it will not be amiss, I think, for me to discuss two Roman citizens who acquired the same glory by different methods, both of which were praiseworthy.

22. How the Severity of Manlius Torquatus and the Sociability[2] of Valerius Corvinus won for Each the same Degree of Fame[3]

Note the statement “equal in virtue,” meaning again political virtue or skill.

Manlius Torquatus (c. 350 BC) was a Roman consul and general who was known for his severity. Livy records the following: "L. Manlius was accordingly nominated, but, regarding his appointment as due to political rather than to religious reasons and eager to command in the war with the Hernici, he caused a very angry feeling among the men liable to serve by the incon- siderate way in which he conducted the enrolment. At last, in consequence of the unanimous resistance offered by the tribunes of the plebs, he gave way, either voluntarily or through compulsion, and laid down his Dictatorship."

You can read Livy's account of Manlius' execution of his own son and the origin of the term "Manlian orders."

THERE were living in Rome at the same time two first-class generals, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in virtue, equal in the number of their triumphs and equal in fame. In dealing with the enemy the virtue they each displayed in the conquests they made was also on a par, but in the way they handled the army and in their treatment of the troops they behaved very differently. For Manlius was a commander who used every type of severity, and never let his soldiers off either fatigues or punishments. Valerius, on the other hand, treated them with the utmost consideration in every way, and in his bearing was familiar and homely. Consequently one finds one of them killing his own son in order to secure the obedience of the troops, and the other harming nobody. None the less, from their diverse methods they reaped the same fruit, alike in contest with the enemy and [466] in the honour brought both to the republic and to themselves. For no soldier ever shirked battle, or mutinied or failed to comply with the wishes of either of them; though so peremptory were Manlius's commands that all orders which exceeded the bounds of moderation came to be called `Manlian orders'. Hence we must first inquire how it came about that Manlius was constrained to behave with such rigidity: secondly, what enabled Valerius to behave with such consideration; thirdly, what caused these different methods to produce the same effect; and, finally, which is the better way and which the most useful to imitate.

Marcus Valerius Corvus was a contemporary of Manlius and was often compared to him. Livy says he "was devoted to all his countrymen, especially to the soldiers and above all to his own army.

You can read Livy's account of Valerius' inspiring speech to his troops.

Titus Livy (d. 17 AD) was, along "with Sallust and Tacitus, one of the three great Roman historians. His history of Rome became a classic in his own lifetime and exercised a profound influence on the style and philosophy of historical writing down to the 18th century" (Encyclopedia Britannica).

If anyone considers carefully the character of Manlius from the time when Titus Livy first mentions him, he will realize that he was a very brave man, devoted to his father and to his country, and very respectful towards his superiors. This is shown in his killing of that Gaul, by his defence of his father against the tribune, and from what he said to the consul before he went to fight the Gaul, namely: `Without an order from you I will never fight against any enemy, even though I am sure of victory.' When, therefore, a man of this kind obtains the rank of commander he expects to find everybody else like himself, and the boldness which characterizes him makes him order bold actions, and what he orders he expects to be carried out in precisely the way he prescribes. It is indeed a very sound rule that, when harsh commands are given, one should be harsh in seeing them carried out; otherwise you will find yourself let down. It should also be noted that, if one wants to be obeyed, one should know how to command, and that one can know how to command only if one has compared one's own character with the character of those who have to obey, and gives orders only when one sees that they harmonize and, when they clash, abstains.

It has been said by a wise man that, if one is to hold a state by violent means, the force employed should be proportionate to [467] the resistance offered. So long as this proportion obtains, it is to be expected that the violence will last; but should the violated be stronger than the violator, it is probable that the violence will some day cease.

But to return to our discourse. I maintain that, if bold things are to be ordered, one must be a bold man; and that, given a man has the strength and that he issues bold orders, then he cannot be soft in seeing that his orders are obeyed; whereas a man who has not this strength of character, should be careful not to give such out-of-the-way orders, but in giving orders can afford to act in accordance with his common humanity, because ordinary punishments are not ascribed to the ruler, but to the laws and institutions. It must be supposed, therefore, that Manlius was constrained to act thus rigidly owing to the extraordinary orders he gave, to which he was inclined by his nature. And that such orders should be given is useful in a republic, since they restore its discipline to its pristine state and revive its ancient virtue. And, as we have said before, should a republic be so fortunate as frequently to have men who by their example give fresh life to its laws, and do not merely stop them going to rack and ruin, but restore their former vigour, such a republic would last for ever.

Such a one was Manlius, for by the harshness of his commands he maintained military discipline in Rome, whereunto he was constrained first by his nature and then by his desire to see those orders carried out which his natural appetite had prompted him to issue. Valerius, on the other hand, could go gently, as one to whom it sufficed to see done what it was customary to do in the Roman armies. These customs, since they were sound, were enough to keep up his reputation, and since they were not hard to observe, there was no need for Valerius to punish delinquents, because there weren't any, but had there been any they would have ascribed their punishment, as was said, to the ordinances, not to the brutality of their [468] prince. So that Valerius could indulge his natural bent for kindliness of all sorts, and by these means acquire gratitude from the troops and be able to keep them contented. It thus came about that, since the same obedience was shown to both, both were able to produce the same effect though by different means. Those who desire to imitate them may, however, fall into the vices I mentioned in connection with Hannibal and Scipio, namely, the evoking of contempt or of hatred, vices which you can avoid only if in you there be more than ordinary virtue, but not otherwise.

It remains to consider which of these two ways of behaving is the more praiseworthy. This is open to question, I think, for some authors praise one and some the other. Yet writers who describe how a prince should govern, incline rather to Valerius than to Manlius, and Xenophon, whom I have cited already, gives many instances illustrative of Cyrus's consideration for others, and thus agrees closely with what Titus Livy says of Valerius. For, when he was consul in the Samnite war, and the day came on which they had to give battle, he addressed his troops with the same consideration he usually displayed in dealing with them. Having given the speech, Titus Livy adds these remarks: `No commander was ever more familiar with his soldiers, for he deemed it no burden to share their duties with the meanest of them. He would take part especially in their military sports, in which men contend with one another in speed and strength as equals, and in this easy comradeship never changed his countenance whether he won or was beaten. He was never contemptuous towards anyone who challenged him as an equal. In his actions he was kind when circumstances permitted, and in his conversation was scarce less mindful of the liberty of others than he was of his own dignity. And - what is more popular than aught else - he behaved towards them just as he had behaved when a candidate for office.'

[469] Titus Livy speaks with the same respect of Manlius, pointing out that the severity he showed in killing his son, made the army obey him when he was consul, which was the cause of the victory gained by the Roman people over the Latins. Indeed, in praising him he goes further than this, for, after mentioning this victory, he describes in detail how he drew the troops up for this battle, points out the dangers which the Roman people ran in it, and the difficulty they had in winning it, and ends with the remark that it was the virtue of Manlius alone that gave the Romans the victory. He compares, too, their respective forces, and asserts that whichever side had had Manlius as consul would have won. Hence, in view of what historians have said, it is difficult to judge between Manlius and Valerius.

Notice the distinction here between public virtue and private ambition.

I do not want to leave the matter undecided, however, so shall say this. For a citizen who is living under the laws of a republic I think it is more praiseworthy and less dangerous to adopt the procedure of Manlius, since this way of behaving was entirely in the public interest, and was in no way affected by private ambition, for it is impossible to gain partisans if one is harsh in one's dealing with everybody and is wholly devoted to the common good, because by doing this one does not acquire particular friends or - as I have just called them - partisans. Wherefore, than such a procedure none can be more advantageous or more desirable in a republic, since it neither fails to take account of the interests of the public nor does it suggest that personal power is in any way being sought. But of Valerius's procedure the contrary is true, for, though so far as the public is concerned, it has the same effects, yet, if a man should win the special goodwill of the troops and should retain his command for long, there is grave reason to fear that the result may be prejudicial to liberty.

Valerius Publicola (meaning "a favorer or friend of the people") was Roman consul in the early Republic well-favored by the people. As Livy explains: "Laws were passed which not only cleared the consul from suspicion but produced such a reaction that he won the people's affections, hence his sobriquet of Publicola. The most popular of these laws were those which granted a right of appeal from the magistrate to the people and devoted to the gods the person and property of any one who entertained projects of becoming king. Valerius secured the passing of these laws while still sole consul, that the people might feel grateful solely to him."

If such prejudicial effects were lacking in the case of Publicola, the reason was that the minds of the Romans [470] were not as yet corrupt, and that he did not hold office for a long time without intermission. But if one takes the case of a prince, which is the case Xenophon is considering, we should have to side wholly with Valerius and to discard Manlius. For a prince should seek to gain the obedience and affection of his soldiers and of his subjects; their obedience by his fidelity to the constitution and by the reputation he has for virtue; their affection by his affability, kindliness, compassion, and the other qualities for which Valerius was conspicuous; and Cyrus also, so Xenophon tells us. For that a prince should be well liked by each of his subjects and should have a devoted army, is in conformity with other features appertaining to his princely status. But for the army to be devoted to the cause of a private citizen is not consistent with his position, since he is bound by the laws and should obey the magistrates.

We read in the annals of ancient Venice, that when the galleys of this republic had returned to port, a quarrel arose between the sailors and the populace resulting in disturbances in which arms were used; nor could the tumult be quelled either by the police force or by highly respected citizens, or by fear of the magistrates, until a gentleman who had been in command of the sailors the year before, suddenly appeared before them and they stopped fighting out of the affection they had for him. This subservience aroused such suspicions in the senate that the Venetians shortly afterwards made sure of him either by imprisonment or death.

Machiavelli distinguishes between those strategies that are fitting for a prince as opposed to those that befit a republic.

Livy records Manlius' own words when he felt his son''s disobedience had "forced upon me the necessity of forgetting either my duty to the republic or my duty to myself and my children;, it is better that we should suffer the consequences of our offence ourselves than that the State should expiate our crime by inflicting great injury upon itself."

I conclude, therefore, that Valerius' method is advantageous in the case of a prince but harmful in the case of a private citizen, alike to his country and to himself; to his country because such behaviour prepares the way for tyranny; to himself because the suspicion his behaviour arouses forces his city to protect itself against him to his own undoing. On the other hand, I claim that in a prince the behaviour of Manlius is [471] harmful and in a private citizen of advantage, especially to his country. Nor will it hurt the private citizen unless the hatred you incur by your severity is intensified by the suspicion to which the great reputation your virtue has brought you, may give rise; as we shall now show that it did in the case of Camillus.

23. Upon what Account Camillus was banished from Rome

WE have just reached the conclusion that anyone who behaves like Valerius does harm both to his country and to himself, but that if he behaves as Manlius did he helps his country and sometimes harms himself. This is borne out to a large extent by the case of Camillus, whose behaviour was more like that of Manlius than Valerius. Hence Titus Livy says of him that `the soldiers both hated and admired his virtue'.

The Veientes were the people of the city of Veii, "located about 10 miles northwest of Rome. The town had hegemony over Rome in the 7th and 6th centuries; a subsequent series of wars ended in the destruction of Veii (396 BC). Its destruction was not total, however, and the Romans later reconstructed the city. Under Augustus it was made a municipium, and up to the 3rd century AD it continued as a religious centre" (Encyclopedia Britannica).

It was his solicitude, his prudence, his magnanimity and the good discipline he maintained in his administration and command of the army, that caused him to be so much admired. It was because he was more severe in chastizing than generous in rewarding that he came to be hated. For this hatred Titus Livy ascribes the following reasons. First, he assigned the money which had been obtained from the sale of goods taken from the Veientes, to the public use, instead of distributing it with the booty. Secondly, at his triumph he caused his triumphal chariot to be drawn by four white horses, which they said was due to his pride and to his desire to emulate the Sun. Thirdly, he made a vow to give a tenth part of the Veientian booty to Apollo, and, in order to fulfil this vow, had to deprive the soldiers of booty on which they had already laid their hands.

From this it may clearly and easily be seen what kind of thing makes a prince odious to his people. Of such things the chief is to deprive them of what they value. This is a matter of [472] considerable importance because, when a man is deprived of something which possesses intrinsic value, he never forgets it, and you are reminded of it every time you in any way need it; and, since such need is of daily occurrence, you are reminded of it every day. The other thing is to be proud and puffed up in your bearing; than which nothing is more odious to the populace, especially when that populace is free. And even should this pride and ostentation cause them no inconvenience, they none the less hate him who displays it. Hence a ruler should avoid this as he would a rock, for to draw hatred down on your head without deriving thence any profit is an extremely rash and in no wise a prudent policy.